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A Road Less 
~ 
Traveled to a 
Federal ERA 
by John Paul Jones 
Wen Congress's deadline expired in 1982, the Federal Equal Rights Amendment was still three states short of the Constitutionally required number for 
ratification. If that deadline had any meaning, it had to be 
that those favoring a Federal ERA would have to begin again 
the process set forth in Article V, either by reintroducing the 
amendment in Congress, or by obtaining support by enough 
states for a constitutional convention. 
An equal rights amendment was first introduced in Con-
gress in 1923, shortly after ratification of the Nineteenth 
Amendment afforded women a Constitutional guarantee of 
suffrage. It was reintroduced in every Congress from 1924 to 
1970. A subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee first 
reported favorably on the amendment in 1936, and subcom-
mittees in both houses reported favorably the following year. 
In its present form, the ERA passed the Senate in 1946 by 
three votes. With the so-called Hayden rider (preserving laws 
benefitting or exempting women) attached, the amendment 
passed the Senate again in both 1950 and 1953. The amend-
ment failed to secure the requisite two-thirds necessary for 
submission to the states until1972. 
ERA's Route Through Congress 
The Congressional route, which brought ratification so 
near in 1982, seems still the favored one. On January 14, 1991, 
forty-eight Senators co-sponsored a Senate Joint Resolution 
proposing to the states a constitutional amendment phrased 
exactly like that which failed ratification in 1982. On the same 
day, 129 Members of the House did likewise. So, the campaign 
begins again. The question remains where is and should it be 
going? 
Were the question put in 1982, a ratificationist would have 
answered by saying that we still need an ERA and should 
prepare to go the distance to see it ratified. As a ratificationist, 
I would have urged the struggle forward in 1982 on the basis 
of the following legal argument. 
Ratificationist Says Need for ERA Unchanged 
America needs an ERA as much now as ever. Neither 
safeguards in the United States Constitution's Fifth and 
Fourteenth amendments nor guarantees in federal civil rights 
statutes like Title VII and Title IX are enough to guarantee 
that the past won't repeat itself. Only a generation ago, the 
United States Supreme Court could resort to blatant sexual 
stereotypes in upholding a law excluding women from licens-
ing as bartenders. Only a generation ago, Congress could 
complacently turn a blind eye to the systematic exclusion of 
women from education and commerce. 
Just as history entitles Jews to fear a future pogrom, 
history also entitles women to fear re-imprisonment in the 
seraglio. All that women really have today in America is a 
promise by a predominantly male government that federal 
law will ensure their rights. But, in the long run, who will 
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ensure those rights against the very men who make such a 
promise? Only the Constitution can legally inhibit our na-
tional legislature. So, unless the ERA is passed, women's 
rights remain vulnerable to the first misogynic Congress that 
comes along. 
An anti-ratificationist, on the other hand, would have 
answered in 1982 that another battle for the ERA would not be 
worth the candle. As an anti-ratificationist twenty years ago, 
I would have based my resistance to reviving the ERA on the 
following legal argument. 
Anti-Ratificationist says ERA Moot 
An ERA in the eighties would add little, if anything, to the 
status afforded women by existing law. As several post-mortems 
on the ratification campaign of the seventies have demon-
strated, the United States Supreme Court had become 
decidedly hostile to sex discrimination by 1982. In a series of 
decisions beginningwithReedv. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)(in-
validating an Idaho law which preferred men for court 
appointments as estate administrators) which continued at 
least through Wenglerv. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 
U.S. 142 (1980)(invalidating Missouri law which provided 
death benefits to all workers' widows but only to worker's 
widowers who could prove dependency), the Supreme Court 
used the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to strike down a 
variety of laws discriminating against women. 
By Wengler, the Court had made clear its intenJJ;o afford 
women almost the same judicial protection from discrimina-
tion that, in keeping with the evident purpose of the Fourteenth 
amendment, it afforded the descendants of former slaves. 
Indeed, if the Court's statements in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 
351 (1974) (upholding Florida property tax exemption for 
widows but not widowers because of the financial straits in 
which widows commonly were found) and Schlesinger v. 
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding Navy regulations 
which allowed women officers who had been passed over for 
promotion to remain in the service longer than men in light of 
the barriers to assignment of women to career enhancing sea 
or combat duties) were compared with the several opinions in 
Regents of the University v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), such 
a comparison would readily lead to the conclusion that the 
Court would be more likely to find women entitled to affirma-
tive action than black Americans. If, in the eighties, women 
already enjoy at least the equal protection of laws, what 
marginal advantage couldjustifyanother bitter ERA struggle? 
Let well enough alone. 
Climate Change for 1990's 
But here we are in the 1990's, and what, if anything, has 
changed? Someone else might speak competently to the 
political arguments by both ratificationist and anti-
ratificationist. I will speak to their legal arguments. 
The legal argument of the ratificationist remains the same 
in the continued absence of a Constitutional amendment. 
Nothing much has changed: the rights of women to equality in 
various settings continue to exist by legislative grace. Indeed, 
the new Civil Rights Act of 1991 enhances such rights in 
important ways, and seems to renew the pledge that women's 
equality is safe in the hands of Congress. 
On the other hand, the assurances of the anti-ratificationist 
that the Supreme Court does not need an explicit amendment 
to enforce sexual equality ring less true with each succeeding 
Supreme Court term. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct. 1759 (1991) 
(upholding U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
regulations which severely restricted, in non-profit family 
planning clinics accepting federal funds, a physician's discre-
tion to furnish a patient with abortion-related advice) was a 
stupendous decision, not only because of its implications for 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and the right to abortion 
freedom, but also because of what the Court said about free 
speech and judicial control of lawmaking. The Rust decision 
is no freak. From one end of the Bill of Rights to the other, the 
Rehnquist Court has, especially in the last two terms, been 
riding rough-shod. Mter cases like Rust, Employment Div. v. 
Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990) (holding against religious dis-
crimination claim Oregon's refusal of unemployment 
compensation to two members of the Native American Church 
fired for sacramental consumption ofpeyote),Barnesv. Glen 
Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456 ( 1991) (holding against First Amend-
ment free expression claim Indiana's public indecency law as 
applied to non-obscene live nude dancing) and California v. 
HodariD, 111 S. Ct.1547 (1991) (Fourth Amendment protec-
tion from unreasonable arrest does not apply to police chase 
beforehand), I am no longer at ease entrusting my own--or 
anybody else's-rights to an inference drawn by the United 
States Supreme Court. 
Addition of Clarence Thomas 
Justice Thomas's presence seems to bode especially ill for 
the rights of women, as his recent opinion for the D.C. Circuit 
Court in Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992), 
clearly evidences. So, if you can't trust the Congress to ensure 
women's equality under the law, you can't trust today's Su-
preme Court either. Neither civil rights laws in the hands of 
Congress nor the constitutional amendment in the hands of 
the Supreme Court can offer complete security, but, like a belt 
with suspenders, having both can make very unlikely their 
simultaneous failure. An ERA would present both Congress 
and the Court with an explicit statement of Constitutional 
guarantee, not simply a permissible inference of one. 
Bleak Future for ERA 
So what future do I see for a revived ERA campaign? 
Frankly, I see little chance of success. Over ten thousand 
amendments have been proposed in just over 200 years. Only 
twenty-seven have been added to our Constitution. Consider-
ing that two thirds of both houses must endorse any amendment 
Congress proposes to the states, the process for amendment is 
arguably biased against amendment. Then, three fourths of 
the states, acting either through their legislatures or through 
conventions called for the exclusive purpose, must vote to 
ratify. 
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For an amendment like the ERA that restricts government, 
that's a lot of legislators selflessly agreeing to limit their own 
lawmaking prerogatives. As few as thirteen state representa-
tives could frustrate ratification, were each to cast a single nay 
vote in a different state. Small wonder that the subject of four 
of the sixteen amendments since the Bill of Rights has been 
the presidency, a lawmaking institution that has no role in the 
amending process. Small wonder that another amendment, 
the Eleventh, restricts the federal courts, another lawmaking 
institution with no role in the amending process. 
Grassroots Reform has Poor Track Record 
The only successful grassroots effort to take power from 
those with Article V power was the Eighteenth (Prohibition) 
amendment. That amendment in effect said that courts would 
make sure neither Congress nor the states permitted liquor 
sales. Arguably, such an amendment could only have suc-
ceeded in an era before Congress and the state legislatures 
had experienced significant judicial encroachments on their 
authority. 
Today, legislators, particularly state legislators, can look 
back in frustration at numerous instances of judicial med-
dling in cases involving bussing, school prayer, pornography, 
and, of course, abortion. One might point to the Reconstruc-
tion amendments as other examples of successful curtailments 
of state legislatures. But, to do so is to substantially underes-
timate the intimidation by occupying Federal troops on the 
amendment decisions of former Confederate states. We are 
not likely to see Federal troops lining the chambers when 
state legislatures debate the ERA. 
Legislators Wary of Yielding Power 
These days, I think state legislators are considerably more 
wary of granting, by federal constitutional amendment, a 
judicial license to nullify their lawmaking. I can hear state 
lawmakers asking ratificationists why they trust judges more 
than the very elected representatives whose ratification votes 
they are courting. Of course, recent decisions by the Rehnquist 
Court can be cited to attenuate the shibboleth of judicial 
interference, but it will surely take a decade or more for the 
new jurisprudence to permeate the psyches of local lawmak-
ers. By that time, the new amendment would be likely to 
receive no warmer a Supreme Court reception than the equal 
protection clause received initially inPlessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana law requiring racially 
segregated accommodations in railroad trains). 
I don't take much comfort from senators and representa-
tives lining up in Congress to sponsor the joint resolution 
proposing the ERA again. In the first place, theirs is a no-lose 
position; after all, if they secretly oppose ratification, they can 
always rely on their brothers in the state houses to withhold 
the necessary assents. In the second place, Congress has little 
to lose even if the amendment is ratified. The United States 
Supreme Court has exhibited the greatest reluctance when 
called upon to review a legislative act of Congress, much more 
reluctance than it has shown when invited to discipline states. 
Every indication is that the Supreme Court of the near future 
will be even more deferential to the lawmakers across First 
Street. 
In short, while the need for the amendment is greater now 
than when it failed ratification in 1982, the opposing odds 
seem just as great. What remains are two variables: first, how 
important is it to carry on courageously a political campaign, 
which even if it must fail, is surely the right thing to do; and 
second, to what extent must we always expect legislators to 
act selfishly? In 1919, I would never have predicted that men 
could be induced into sharing with women the power of the 
franchise, and yet they-we-did, by ratifying the Nine-
teenth Amendment. 
International Lawmaking Provides An 
Alternative 
There is an interesting third option. In 1979, the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted and opened for signature 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women (1249 U.N.T.S. 14). It went into force on 
September 3, 1981. 
The Convention is comprehensive in scope, prohibiting: 
[A)ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on 
the basis of sex that has the effect or purpose of 
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by women, regardless of their marital status, 
on the basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. 
The Convention obligates signatory states to pursue "with-
out delay" a policy of eliminating discrimination against women 
"by any person, organization, or enterprise," by taking "all 
appropriate measures including legislation." At the same 
time, the Convention authorizes what we domestically know 
as affirmative action by permitting "temporary special mea-
sures" to acceleratedejacto equality between men and women 
that would otherwise constitute sex discrimination. More-
over, the Convention obligates each signatory state to "take 
appropriate measures" to alter social and cultural norms to 
eliminate stereotypes and sex prejudice. 
The Convention imposes in international law specific du-
ties to combat discrimination in many areas already covered 
by federal civil rights law such as politics and suffrage, citizen-
ship, education, employment, and social benefits. While the 
Convention calls specifically for an end to discrimination 
against women in health care, it also requires signatory states 
to provide all women with adequate nutrition and services 
during pregnancy and the post-natal period. 
Across-the-Board Equality 
Silent on abortion per se, the Convention calls for women's 
equality in all matters relating to family and marriage. It 
creates for women a right "to decide freely and responsibly on 
the number and spacing of their children and to have access 
to the information, education and means to enable them to 
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exercise these rights." Signatory states must report regularly 
to the United Nations on their progress toward fulfilling the 
many specific obligations set forth in the Convention. A sepa-
rate international committee of experts will scrutinize these 
reports and comment on them to the United Nations Commis-
sion on the Status of Women. In short, the Convention is an 
omnibus effort to end discrimination against women around 
the world. 
Americans Active at Drafting 
Representatives of the United States participated actively 
in the drafting of this Convention, and President Carter signed 
it on behalf of the United States on July 17, 1980. He transmit-
ted it (along with a State Department report on its potential 
consequences for American law) to the Senate for advice and 
consent four months later, but the 96th Senate took no action, 
and no Senate has acted since. No hearings were conducted 
for eight years after the Senate received the Convention. The 
first hearings were held in 1988, and more were held by the 
101st Congress in 1990. 
Senate Consent Not Yet Forthcoming 
Internationally, the Convention went into force in 1981, 
(Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General 
at 151, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER. E/3, art. 27(1) (Dec. 31, 
1984)). One hundred and ten countries had ratified the 
Convention by March 18, 1992 but, without Senate consent 
and Presidential ratification, it has not yet become the law of 
the United States. 
The 102th Senate is blaming the delay on the White House, 
because neither President Reagan nor President Bush has 
ever offered the Senate their administration's reservations, 
understandings, and declarations (as President Carter did in 
Secretary of State Muskie's Memorandum). The Senate ap-
parently deems the views of the White House essential to 
Senate consent. 
Preemptive Etl'ect on State Law 
By the Federal Constitution's Supremacy Clause, the Con-
vention, once ratified, would, like any treaty, override any 
conflicting state law. It would thereby establish, at least as 
well as the ERA, sex equality in every state. The Convention 
would also hold the Congress to its civil rights promises, more 
than would an ordinary federal law, albeit less than a consti-
tutional amendment. Theoretically, Congress could act to 
abrogate the treaty, but resistance, both institutional and 
public, to reneging on formal promises made in the commu-
nity of nations ought to be much greater than resistance to the 
repeal of a dome~ tic civil rights act. 
Shortcut to Approval 
What attracts me about the Convention is thatit needs only 
federal action, that is consent by the Senate and signature by 
the President. Neither the House of Representatives nor the 
state legislatures act on treaties or international agreements. 
The Convention could therefore become the law of the land 
without lobbying state legislators, the lawmakers most likely 
to suffer its consequences and most resistant to an ERA. 
Persuading one President and sixty seven members of the 
national upper house that a single law ought to apply nation-
wide is a much more manageable lobbying effort, not only 
because of the limited numbers and single location, but also 
because of the nature of the offices. 
Both the Presidency and the Senate are national offices 
whose occupants should be unintimidated by new bans on sex 
discrimination. Federal civil rights laws have already estab-
lished equality as a legal norm in the major areas of federal 
lawmaking. The Government Employment Acts of 1991 (Pub. 
L. No. 102, 106 Stat. 3 (1991)) extended to employees of the 
Senate protection from gender discrimination similar to that 
afforded other employees by Title VII. In Da~ v. P~n, 
442 U.S. 228 (1979), for example, the Supreme Court held a 
Congressman liable under the Fifth Amendment for gender 
discrimination in staff promotion and hiring. 
Nor are the President and Senators likely to be sympa-
thetic enough to state autonomy to resist ratification lobbying 
like state legislators would. While Presidents are formally 
chosen by an electoral college assembled according to proce-
dures dictated by state legislatures, the Presidential two-term 
limitation and the electoral college's deep-seated tradition of 
following the popular vote prevent state legislators from 
commanding any loyalty from the oval office. 
Once the Federal Constitution provided for the selection of 
Senators by state legislatures, and those selected were there-
fore naturally responsive to the preferences of those in the 
state houses who held the power of reappointment. Passage of 
the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, however, providing for 
popular election of the Senate, emancipated the members of 
the national upper house from servitude to the controlling 
factions in state legislatures. This change surely left Senators 
less sensitive to concerns about subordinating state autonomy 
to their views of the national interest. Thus, neither the 
President nor thirty-four senators ought to oppose the Con-
vention as much as some state legislators opposed the ERA. 
They lack the stake and they risk much greater exposure. 
Some Critical Drawbacks 
As a way of outlawing discrimination against women in this 
country, ratification of an international convention is not 
without its drawbacks. There is, first, the problem of White 
House procrastination. Some senators feel constrained, or at 
least claim to feel constrained, to withhold consent in the 
absence of formal interpretation by the current administra-
tion. No such constraint appears on the face of the Constitution, 
but Presidential practice oflate has conditioned the Senate to 
demand some sort of statement by the White House as to how 
the Executive Branch plans to interpret that to which the 
Senate consents. For example, President Reagan's 1985 re-
intrepretation oftheABM Treaty to permit certain research in 
conjunction with the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") 
took many in the Senate by surprise. This understanding of the 
scope of the treaty clearly differed from the Senate's interpre-
tation a decade earlier, as evidenced by Senate debates at the 
time of its consent. It brought to a head Constitutional issues 
of whether the Senate's interpretation, at the time it gives 
consent to a treaty, binds the executive branch then or 
thereafter, and whether an interpretation, offered the Senate 
by the Executive branch, binds either the administration 
which offers it or any which follow. 
These two, as yet unresolved, issues obviously prompt the 
Senate to pry out of the White House as definitive a statement 
of what the White House thinks the agreement means as the 
Senate can get. While the Senate rightfully evinces concern 
for harmony between the branches as to the interpretation of 
an international agreement, inaction in Congress is only one 
of several responses to silence in the White House. When more 
than a decade passes without Senate consent, Senate inaction 
begins to suggest inter-branch concert rather than conflict. 
Once the Senate gives its consent, the President becomes the 
exclusive object of lobbying efforts, for only his signature is 
then lacking to achieve ratification. 
No Interpretive Conflict 
If the Senate's concern is that a present or future admin-
istration will eventually interpret the Convention in some 
important way different from the interpretation offered by the 
Carter administration, nothing is gained by waiting around for 
a memorandum that seems unlikely to issue from the Bush 
administration. 
No interpretive conflict now exists, so a ratified Conven-
tion should appear a better alternative than a non-ratified 
Convention to a Senate already on record as enthusiastically 
in favor of ending sex discrimination by Constitutional amend-
ment. More than most subjects ofinternational agreements, a 
human rights convention virtually guarantees a continuing 
interpretative role for the domestic lawmaking body, so the 
Senate need not fear corruption of the Convention by subse-
quent conflicting interpretation in the White House. 
A second problem for those backing the UN Convention is 
limiting reservations and conditions. Although the Constitu-
tion is silent on the matter, the Senate has the power to 
impose conditions on its consent to a treaty or other interna-
tional agreement. Such conditions have come to be expressed 
in either of two ways: by insisting in the ratification resolution 
that the President amend the text of the treaty upon ratifica-
tion, or else by inserting additional material in the ratification 
resolution itself. 
Conditions imposed by the Senate cannot be incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the agreement. The wide-
spread practice of reservation among signatory states has 
particularly plagued the Convention to End All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women. By last summer, one com-
mentator could report that at least twenty-three states had 
made a total of eighty-eight reservations to the rights guaran-
teed by the Convention and another twenty-five states had 
opted out of procedure for dispute resolution. The Senate 
needs to be convinced of the rectitude of consent without 
much-if any-reservation. 
State Department Review 
In the Memorandum attached by President Carter to the 
Convention for transmittal to the Senate, the State Depart-
ment reviewed the Convention and its impact on U.S. law. 
Where a likely conflict could be discerned, the Department 
suggested alternative resolutions: either legislation bringing 
domestic law into compliance with international obligations 
under the Convention or else Senate reservation to limit the 
Convention's U.S. impact short of its intended global reach. 
One issue for which reservation is a suggested solution is 
whether the Convention has force in areas of law traditionally 
left to the individual states. Those opposed to the principles 
underlying both the ERA and the Convention are very likely to 
raise states' rights objections to an international agreement 
capable of nullifying state laws which discriminate in areas 
like marriage, family, and private associations. 
Such objections have been persuasively criticized as spe-
cious, but they nevertheless have a potential for distracting 
some Senators or furnishing others an apparently principled 
excuse for a reservation. The more such reservations are 
fashioned, the less the Convention will do in the United States, 
so it obviously behooves the advocates of ratification to insist 
the fewest conditions. 
While the threat to the Convention of enervating reserva-
tions is a real one, as both international practice and the State 
Department memorandum make clear, it does not change the 
underlying assessment that makes the Convention an appro-
priate goal for supporters of a national ERA. The advantage 
offered by Convention ratification over amendment ratifica-
tion is still there - only the Senate and President, and not 
thirty-eight state legislatures, must be persuaded right now. 
While endorsement by states and the House of Represen-
tatives would make the task of persuading first the Senate, 
and then the President easier, the absence of such endorse-
ments is no real impediment to action by either. The Senate 
is already on record as favoring a Federal ERA, and its under-
lying principles. 
Art of the Possible 
Nothing suggests that a state-by-state ERA campaign could 
secure ratification in the near future when it could not in the 
decade before 1982. It is therefore even riskier for those 
dedicated to women's rights to embark on such a campaign a 
second time. Instead of proceeding directly toward Constitu-
tional amendment, I propose a crooked road that begins with 
ratification of the United Nations Convention to End All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women. One hundred and 
ten nations have already made the Convention part of their 
domestic law, and it has been international law among the 
signatory nations since 1981. Ratification of the Convention 
does not require the assent of the several states, only the 
consent of the Senate and the signature of the President. 
Continued on page 54 
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Birth 
Continued from page 36 
time came, after fourteen sleepless nights, the two hours that 
we set aside grew to five. 
It was a nightmare; Bill was doing a Westlaw search on all 
the cases that we cited; Esther was "bleeding all over the 
pages" as she edited with a red pen. I was frantically trying to 
type in her corrections, and Stuart was running all over the 
library to locate the correct cites that were incomplete in our 
drafts. However, at 5:30 p.m. on a Friday afternoon, the 
(somewhat) complete document was turned over to both 
Eileen and Professor Jones. None of the rest of us ever wanted 
to see it again for quite some time. 
Unfortunately, our wish was not quite granted. Several 
days later, the four of us sat with Professor Jones and spent 
four quality hours editing the final text. Eileen had trans-
posed what we had written with a brief that she had done. 
(She somehow managed to put the whole paper together over 
the weekend.) 
The end result was a small book that we felt was quite well 
written. Now that the project is over, I feel that I must admit 
that each time VMI objected to some part of our brief and 
especiallywhen the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the 
case, the four of us experienced a bit of pure delight. We will 
always be thankful to Eileen Wagner and Professor Jones for 
giving us the opportunity to work on the brief and the chance 
to work with them. 0 
Road 
Continued from page 45 
Unlike an ERA ratification campaign, a campaign to secure 
ratification of the Convention can therefore be concentrated 
in Washington. The Senate is already on record as supporting 
the ERA, and should therefore be especially susceptible to 
arguments that the Convention accomplishes much of what 
the Senate endorsed in proposing an ERA to the states in every 
year since 1984. 
Once the Convention is ratified, it becomes a powerful 
lever for both expansion of Federal Civil Rights proscriptions 
into areas of sex discrimination previously deemed the busi-
ness of the several states, and for explicit recognition of 
women's rights in a Federal Constitutional amendment. 0 
Freedom of Speech 
Continued from page 40 
distinguished between "mere advocacy" of illegal activity and 
remarks which are "likely to incite or produce such actions." 
Language that is merely offensive or derogatory arguably does 
not even reach the level of the former. 
Limitation on freedom of expression in the university 
setting has been viewed by such scholars as law professor 
Gerald Gunther of Stanford as being " ... not only incompatible 
with the mission and meaning of a university ... (but) also 
send(ing) exactly the wrong message from academia to soci-
ety as a whole." 
Former Yale President Benno C. Schmidt, Jr. has warned 
against the unleashing of a "vague and unpredictable empire 
of suppression" by unjustifiably stretching the line of true 
threats and fighting words" to include offensive speech in 
general. And the restructuring of traditional curricula (on the 
issue of race, gender, and ethnicity) to accommodate those 
faculty who have their own agenda of what is the "greater 
good" of those who exercise political clout with respect to 
university policy, and the promulgation of anti-harassment 
codes has been labeled as "cross(ing) the line that separates 
the legal from the illegal" by a distinguished professor of law 
at one non-Virginia public university. 
The public university in particular has been somewhat set 
aside for special First Amendment treatment, regarded as a 
"haven of free speech." 
These remarks are not to infer that racist, sexist, or 
ethnically abusive language is to be condoned or encouraged 
in the academic community or elsewhere, or to disparage the 
well-directed efforts of those persons endeavoring to elimi-
nate such language. These efforts, however, must be tempered 
with the recognition that free and unfettered expression is a 
right constitutionally insured and that demeaning and de-
rogatory language often must be tolerated when uttered in the 
public domain. 
The decisions invalidating the G.M.U. activity and the 
speech codes at the Universities of Wisconsin and Michigan 
did not implicitly or explicitly indicate the courts' approvals, 
but rather their acknowledgment of the constitational protec-
tion which extends to such acts and/or remarks. 
Professor Gunther's conclusion best explicates the pur-
pose for the premise that university campuses should assure 
greater, rather than less, freedom of speech than is acceptable 
by society in general: "I believe-in my heart as well as my 
mind-that these principles and ideals (i.e., the assurance of 
free expression in the academic setting) are not only estab-
lished but right. I hope that the entire academic community 
will seriously reflect upon the risks to free expression, lest we 
weaken hard-won liberties at our universities and, by ex-
ample, in this nation." 0 
